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RSSH(1)				Derek D. Martin			       RSSH(1)



NAME
       rssh - restricted secure shell allowing only scp and/or sftp

SYNOPSIS
       rssh [ options... ] [ ... ]
       rssh -v

DESCRIPTION
       rssh  is	 a restricted shell for providing limited access to a host via
       ssh(1), allowing a user whose shell is configured to rssh to use one or
       more  of the command(s) scp(1), sftp(1) cvs(1), rdist(1), and rsync(1),
       and only those commands.	 It is intended primarily to work with OpenSSH
       (see  http://www.openssh.com), but may work with other implementations.

       The system administrator should install the  shell  on  the  restricted
       system.	 Then  the  password  file  entry  of  any user for whom it is
       desireable to provide restricted access should  be  edited,  such  that
       their shell is rssh. For example:

	      luser:x:666:666::/home/luser:/usr/bin/rssh

       If  invoked with the -v option, rssh will report its version, and exit.
       All other arguments to rssh are those specified by  the	remote	ssh(1)
       client,	and aren't of much concern to the average user.	 The arguments
       provided must be what a shell on the remote end would receive in	 order
       to  pass	 control  to scp(1), sftp(1), etc.  If rssh receives arguments
       which do not conform, it will emit an error message and exit.   If  the
       program	the  user  is trying to run is not allowed, or contains syntax
       which will try to execute a shell command (such as a command  substitu-
       tion), it will also emit an error and exit.

       rssh  has  a configuration file, rssh.conf(5), which allows some of the
       behavior of rssh to be customized.  See that man page for details.

SECURITY NOTES
       Read this section with exceptional care, or you may put your system  at
       risk!

   Using rssh With CVS
       If  you	are using rssh to allow CVS access, it should be noted that it
       is not possible to prevent a user who is very familiar  with  CVS  from
       bypassing rssh and getting a shell, unless the user does not have write
       access in the repository.  Obviously, the user must have	 write	access
       to  the	repository  in order to update it, which allows them to upload
       arbitrary programs into the repository.	CVS  provides  several	mecha-
       nisms  for  executing  such  arbitrary programs...  The only reasonably
       safe way to use rssh with CVS is to use the chroot jail	facilities  to
       place  the  CVS	repository within a chroot jail.  Please see below and
       all relevant documentation for details of how to set up	chroot	jails.
       Note that users will still be able to get shell access within the jail;
       the only protection which is provided is that they can not  escape  the
       jail.   I  have	been  pursuaded to retain support for CVS because this
       protection is better than no protection.	 You have been warned. Use CVS
       at your own risk.

   Potential root Compromise With Old Versions
       Before  rssh  2.3.0,  if	 a  regular user had shell access to a machine
       where rssh was  installed,  a  root  compromise	was  possible  due  to
       rssh_chroot_helper allowing a user to arbitrarily chroot(2) to anywhere
       on the filesystem.  It is possible  to  mitigate	 this  attack  against
       affected	 versions  of  rssh  using strict access controls to files, by
       making sure that the user can  not  write  to  any  file	 on  the  same
       partition  as system executables, and that any partition where they can
       write files does not allow execution of	SUID  programs.	  As  of  rssh
       2.3.0, this attack has been prevented by preventing arbitrary chroot(),
       if your jail is set up securely.	 In particular, make sure that regular
       users  can  not	write to directories inside the jail which contain the
       copied binaries.	 That should be obvious, but  it  needs	 to  be	 said.
       Though  it  should  not	be strictly necessary, to further protect your
       system from possible compromise, it is also  advisable  to  follow  the
       section below, entitled "Safeguards Against Bypassing rssh".

   Safeguards Against Bypassing rssh
       rssh is designed to interact with several other programs.  Even if rssh
       is completely bug-free, changes in those other programs could  possibly
       result in methods to circumvent the protection that rssh is intended to
       provide.	 It is important for you, the system  administrator,  to  stay
       current	on  the services you make available with rssh, to be sure that
       these commands do not provide mechanisms to allow the user to run arbi-
       trary  commands.	 Also,	while  the  goal of every release is to be bug
       free, no one is perfect...  There may  be  undiscovered	bugs  in  rssh
       which might allow a user to circumvent it.

       You can protect your system from those who would take advantage of such
       weaknesses.  This is not required for rssh to work properly, but it  is
       a really good idea.  There are six basic steps:

	      1.     protect all non-administrator accounts with rssh (i.e. no
		     regular user should have shell access to the server)

	      2.     place your users in a chroot jail

	      3.     limit the binaries which live in the jail to the absolute
		     minimum required

	      4.     mount their home filesystem with the noexec/nosuid option
		     (i.e. use separate partitions in the jail for  user  home
		     directories and all other files, if possible/reasonable)

	      5.     create  a	group  for  rssh  users,  and limit executable
		     access to the binaries to users in that group.

	      6.     use standard file permissions carefully and appropriately

       If  possible,  make  sure  that	no  regular user has any kind of shell
       access to the system other than through rssh.   Otherwise,  users  with
       shell   access	could	potentially   exploit	undiscovered  bugs  in
       rssh_chroot_helper to gain root access to the server.

       rssh gives the system administrator the ability to place the users in a
       chroot jail.  See details in the man page for rssh.conf and in the file
       CHROOT which is distributed with the  source  code.   If	 you  want  to
       ensure  users can not run arbitrary programs, use a chroot jail, and be
       sure not to put any programs other than what are	 absolutely  necessary
       to  provide  the service you are trying to provide.  This prevents them
       from running standard system commands.

       Then, make sure the user's files inside the  jail  are  on  a  seperate
       filesystem  from	 your system's executables.  If possible in your envi-
       ronment, make sure you mount  this  filesystem  using  the  noexec  and
       nosuid  options, if your operating system provides them.	 This prevents
       the users from being able to execute programs which they have  uploaded
       to  the	target	machine (e.g. using scp) which might otherwise be exe-
       cutable, and prevents SUID programs  from  respecting  the  SUID	 bits.
       Note  that  these  options necessitate the users' files are on separate
       partitions from the binaries and	 libraries  that  live	in  the	 jail.
       Therefore  you will need at least 2 partitions for your jail to do this
       properly (one for the system binaries in the jail, the  other  for  the
       user directories).

       Additionally,  create  a group, for example "rsshuser", for rssh users.
       Put all your users who will be restricted by rssh in that  group.   Set
       the  ownership  and  permissions on rssh and rssh_chroot_helper so that
       only those users can  execute  them.   The  following  commands	should
       illustrate:

	      # groupadd rsshuser
	      # chown root:rsshuser rssh rssh_chroot_helper
	      # chmod 550 rssh
	      # chmod 4550 rssh_chroot_helper

       Lastly, use standard Unix/POSIX file permissions to ensure they can not
       access files they should not be able to within the chroot jail.

   Command Line Parser
       As of rssh version 2.2.3, the program must parse out the complete  com-
       mand  line  to  avoid command line options which cause the execution of
       arbitrary programs (and hence bypass the security of rssh).   In	 order
       to keep the program source code sane, the parser is a little over-zeal-
       ous about matching command line options.	 In  practice,	this  probably
       will not be an issue, but in theory it is possible.

       If  you	run  into  a problem where rssh refuses to run, claiming to be
       rejecting insecure command line options which were not  specified,  try
       changing your command line such that all short options are specified as
       single-letter option flags (e.g. -e -p instead of -ep)  and  make  sure
       you  separate  arguments from their respective options by a space (e.g.
       -p 123 instead of -p123).  In virtually all cases,  this	 should	 solve
       the  problem.   Admittedly, an exhaustive search was not performed, but
       no problematical cases were found which were likely to be common.

       The alternative would have been	to  include  a	complete  command-line
       parser for rcp, rdist, and rsync; this was way out of the scope of this
       project.	 In practice, the existing parser should  suffice.   If,  how-
       ever, you find cases where it does not, please post details to the rssh
       mailing list.  Details about how to post to the	mailing	 list  can  be
       found at the rssh homepage.

   OpenSSH Versions and Bypassing rssh
       Prior  to OpenSSH 3.5, sshd(8) will generally attempt to parse files in
       the user's home directory, and may also try to run  a  start-up	script
       from  the  user's  $HOME/.ssh directory.	 rssh does not make use of the
       user's environment in any way.  The relevant  command  is  executed  by
       calling	execv(3)  with	the  full path to the command, as specified at
       compile time.  It does not depend upon the user's PATH variable, or  on
       any other environment variable.

       There  are,  however,  several  problems	 that  can arise.  This is due
       entirely to the way the OpenSSH Project's sshd works, and is in no  way
       the fault of rssh.  For example, one problem which might exist is that,
       according to the sshd(8) man  page  from	 at  least  some  releases  of
       OpenSSH,	 the  commands	listed	in the $HOME/.ssh/rc file are executed
       with /bin/sh instead of the user's defined shell.  This appears not  to
       be  the	case  on the systems the author had available to test on; com-
       mands were executed using the user's configured shell (rssh), which did
       not  allow the execution.  However if it is true on your system, then a
       malicious user may be able to circumvent rssh by uploading  a  file  to
       $HOME/.ssh/rc which will be executed by /bin/sh on that system.	If any
       releases (of OpenSSH) are, in fact, vulnerable to this problem, then it
       is  very	 likely that they are only old, outdated versions.  So long as
       you are running a recent version of OpenSSH, this should not be a prob-
       lem as far as I can tell.

       If  your	 sshd  is vulnerable to this attack, there is a workaround for
       this problem, though it is pretty restrictive.  The user's home	direc-
       tory  absolutely	 must not be writable by the user.  If it is, the user
       can use sftp to remove the directory or rename it, and  then  create  a
       new one, and fill it up with whatever environment files they like.  For
       providing file uploads, this means a user-writable  directory  must  be
       created	for  them,  and	 they must be made aware of their inability to
       write into their home directory other than in this location.

       A second problem is that after authenticating the user, sshd also reads
       $HOME/.ssh/environment  to  allow  the  user  to set variables in their
       environment.  This allows the user to  completely  circumvent  rssh  by
       clever manipulation of such environment variables as LD_LIBRARY_PATH or
       LD_PRELOAD to link the rssh binary against arbitrary shared  libraries.
       In  order to prevent this from being a problem, as of version 0.9.3, by
       default rssh is now compiled statically.	 The  restrictive  work-around
       mentioned above will also defeat this sort of attack.

       As  of  OpenSSH 3.5, sshd now supports the option PermitUserEnvironment
       which is set to "no" by default.	 This option allows restricted	shells
       like  rssh  to  function	 properly  without requiring them to be linked
       statically.  As of rssh version	1.0.1,	the  configure	script	should
       detect  that  OpenSSH 3.5 is present, and disable the default of static
       compilation.

BUGS
       None.  =8^)

   A Note About Getting Help
       If you are having trouble getting rssh working,	or  you	 think	you've
       found  a	 bug,  please  use  the	 mailing  list,	 and  do not e-mail me
       directly.  You must sign up for the list in order to post.  Information
       about how to sign up is available on the rssh homepage.	If you mail me
       directly with questions, I will almost certainly ignore you, or at  the
       very least ask you to repost your question on the mailing list.	Please
       also feel free to provide feedback about	 rssh  on  the	mailing	 list,
       whether positive or negative (especially negative).

   Security Problems
       The  only  exception  to	 the  above is if you believe you have found a
       security problem with rssh.  If that is the case, then please  do  con-
       tact  me	 privately.  If you are unable to find my direct contact info,
       post a message on the mailing list requesting that I contact you	 about
       a  potential  security problem.	Security problems should be dealt with
       privately, so that the threat can be properly assessed, and so  as  not
       to needlessly endanger the installations of rssh in production environ-
       ments.  I take security problems seriously, and will  work  to  resolve
       them as quickly as possible.

   N.B.:
       Before  you  e-mail me (or the mailing list) with questions, be sure to
       THOROUGHLY read all of the following files:  README,  INSTALL,  CHROOT,
       SECURITY.   All	of  these  files  are distributed with the rssh source
       code, as well as all binary packages of	rssh.	If  you	 downloaded  a
       binary  package,	 these files should be located wherever your distribu-
       tion keeps its documentation  files  (usually  /usr/share/doc/rssh-ver-
       sion/  or  something  similar).	Also THOROUGHLY read the man pages for
       rssh(1), and rssh.conf(5).  Finally, if you are still having  problems,
       read  the  FAQ  at  http://www.pizzashack.org/rssh/faq.shtml.  If it is
       clear to me that you have not read these documents, I will ignore  you.
       In most cases, these documents will already have everything you need to
       get rssh working, and I won't be able to explain it  any	 better	 on  a
       mailing list than I did in those documents...

SEE ALSO
       rssh.conf(5), sshd(8), ssh(1), scp(1), sftp(1).



man pages			  18 Dec 2005			       RSSH(1)
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